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Constituent pressure may be more effective than lobbying in
determining whether a bill passes or fails.
What has a greater effect on legislative outcomes, campaign donations and lobbying efforts (the
inside game) or constituent activism (the outside game)? In new research, Jeff Smith – who once
served in the Missouri Senate, representing 175,000 St. Louisans – analyzes the impact of each
method. He finds that contributions had no statistically significant impact on policy outcomes; other
than nourishing a class of political fixers, corporate political spending accomplished little. However,
constituent contacts seem to have had a substantial impact.
Though evidence for the influence of donations and lobbying on legislative behavior is mixed, a
substantial body of research – and conventional wisdom – indicates that well-funded interest groups gain
informational advantages over competitors and inuence over legislation. Research has linked donations and
lobbying expenditures to individual legislators’ behavior and overall legislative success. If money doesn’t help
produce favorable outcomes, observers ask, why would they spend so much?
Foundational research assumes a smooth information flow between firms, their lobbyists, and legislators. Lobbyists
lack autonomy; firms “exercise close control over the objectives and strategies involved”, and firms (principals) shape
preferences of lobbyists (agents). But this model often fails to accurately portray the real world.
The principal-agent problem describes difficulties arising amidst incomplete and asymmetric information when a
principal hires an agent to pursue the principal’s interests, namely, the agent’s potential to “shirk”. In the case of firm
as principal and lobbyist as agent, rational actions by lobbyists and legislators may leave the firm ill-informed and
unsuccessful, for several reasons.
First, most day-to-day lobbying is done not by in-house government affairs professionals but contract lobbyists.
Lobbyists are often several steps removed from the locus of corporate decision-making, since strategy flows from top
executives through a firm’s in-house government affairs department before reaching a contract lobbyist. Thus, a
firm’s strategy may change from its original formulation to a legislator’s ears. Also, because most lobbyists who deal
directly with legislators are contract lobbyists, a firm cannot perfectly monitor back-channel communications to
legislators or legislative staff. Third, lobbyists are independent actors with their own goals which may not coincide
with those of the firm. A firm does not know what conflicting personal policy goals he may have, who his other clients
are or whether they constitute potential conflicts of interest, or whether the lobbyist will expend his political capital on
its behalf or save it for other (higher-paying) clients. And since in most states it is illegal to make lobbyist pay or
bonuses contingent upon outcomes, a lobbyist’s incentives are not typically aligned with his client’s.
Fourth, a firm does not know the exact nature of a lobbyist’s relationship with key legislators. And finally, the firm is
unaware of the nature of a lobbyist’s relationships with other lobbyists. Lobbyists value positive relations with other
lobbyists to facilitate their ability to cut deals and refer or receive prospective clients; this can interfere with a
lobbyist’s ability to provide optimal representation. Also, lobbyists who appear to be tussling may actually be colluding
to keep an issue from being resolved – a delay likely to require their services on retainer for another year. Some
lobbyists have even been known to encourage legislators to file legislation adverse to their clients annually, ensuring
the lobbyist’s continued services.
All of the above may limit firms’ ability to translate dollars into policy outcomes. But what else could be driving the
legislative process? A simple answer is constituent pressure.
Do constituent contacts trump lobbying?
Citizen-activists may influence legislative outcomes via the deterrent effect of mobilized opinion on elected
representatives. Legislators understand that intensity of opinion explains the difference between those who
proactively contact their office versus those who merely respond to polls; that explains, for instance, why National
Rifle Association-favored positions that attract less than 20 percent public support typically carry the day in
legislatures. Accordingly, I hypothesized that direct constituent pressure plays a larger role in legislative outcomes
than professional lobbying or campaign donations, and tested this using a dataset of constituent correspondence
from six Missouri legislators, an improvement over previous research relying on self-reported interest group data.
If civic passion could surmount moneyed influence, Missouri would be an unlikely place for it, given its unlimited
campaign contributions and lobbyist gifts, and its eight-year term limits. [Given research about lobbyist power in term-
limited legislatures, one might expect Missouri lobbyists to have outsize impact.] As a “least likely” case, Missouri
offers unique analytic leverage.
Since the quality of lobbying contacts trumps the quantity, rendering good data very difficult to gather, I focus on
donations instead of lobbying itself as a measure of moneyed influence. After controlling for the party and leadership
position of bill sponsors, I examine whether interest group donations influenced or constituent contacts influenced bill
passage.
My analysis finds that the amount of money contributed by groups both +supporting and opposing a bill had no effect
on its prospects. Constituent contacts in support of a bill increased its odds of passage and those in opposition
decrease the odds. Bills sponsored by Republicans were more likely to pass than bipartisan or Democratic bills, and
bills sponsored by members of leadership were more likely to pass. Neither the amount of money contributed by
groups supporting or opposing legislation had any bearing on the bill’s likelihood of passage, but constituent contacts
did.
I now estimated predicted probabilities of bill passage based on the number of contacts in support of bills. The first
number is contacts in support, and the percentage is the chance of bill passage for bills with that many contacts.
Figure 1 – Constituent Support of Legislation and probability of bill passage
Figure 1 above shows that a bill with no supportive contacts has an 18 percent predicted chance of passage, and a
bill with one supportive contact has a 19 percent predicted chance. Odds of passage rise with the number of contacts.
Next, I examine the number of contacts opposed to legislation, with the results shown in Figure 2, below. The first
number is the number of contacts opposed, and the percentage is the likelihood of bill passage for bills with that
number of contacts. 
Figure 2 – Constituent opposition to Legislation and probability of bill passage
Figure 2 shows that a bill with no opposed contacts has an 82 percent predicted chance of passage, a bill with one
opposed contact was has a 75 percent chance, and odds of passage decline as contacts rise; once a bill had just 17
opposing contacts, it was almost certain (99.2 percent odds) to fail.
These data infer that constituent contacts, not money, impact policy outcomes. Why?
The link between constituents and re-election was more direct than that between contributions & re-
election.  Money may not lead to votes, but constituents who contact legislators often base their vote on the issue
that motivated their contact. As ex-Rep. Barney Frank noted, “Contributions are fungible; you can get new ones. You
can’t get new voters.”
Technology has increased both constituents’ voice and legislators’ ability to listen – in real time – increasing
responsiveness to constituent opinion. The Internet has helped constituent activists become informed in ways
that, decades ago, only insiders could. And while politicians have always solicited constituent feedback, it has never
been this easy, fast, or cheap. Politicians understand that the responsiveness of their email lists correspond to their
value; the ability to mobilize their supporters or quickly raise money increases their clout. This has increased the
immediacy and volume of constituent contact with legislators (Once, after spending 20 minutes of floor debate
responding to a Senator who was filibustering a bill on midwifery, I had nearly 100 angry constituent emails upon
returning to my office).
Informational asymmetries allow lobbyists to “shirk,” decreasing the likelihood of favorable policy outcomes
for clients. Various forces may operate here. First, lobbyists rely on renewals each session. If they achieve a
favorable outcome or a reasonable compromise, the pressing issue disappears, decreasing the likelihood of contract
renewal. Second, legislators realize that firms are more likely to make donations before legislative action than
afterwards. Lobbyists and legislators share an incentive to feign serious effort, but not necessarily pass a bill. There
are enough steps in the legislative process that lobbyists can easily show progress for several years (of retainers)
without changing the law. Does this mean there is an active conspiracy? Not necessarily. As 19th century
Massachusetts Senator Martin Lomasney advised, “Never write if you can speak; never speak if you can nod; never
nod if you can wink.” Firms could minimize this if outcome-based incentives aligned lobbyists’ interests with their own,
but most states criminalize this.
Small, passionate groups who can produce unified constituent activity may thus be better positioned than large
corporate actors. During my tenure in the Missouri state senate, three such groups stood out: lay midwives, noodlers
(hand-fishers), and Freedom of the Road Riders (motorcyclists without helmets). None spent money on politics. All
fought powerful interests: such as the Humane Society, big hospitals, and the public health lobby. Each succeeded by
producing hundreds of personal contacts to each legislator.
Though campaign finance reformers may dispute these findings, they should embrace the evidence that mobilized
activists can affect policy without spending money. And perhaps they should focus more on leveraging technology to
help grassroots activists overcome the power of big money – just as Missouri’s midwives, noodlers, and helmetless
motorcyclists have.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Passion or Dollars? How Mobilization Can Spoil the Mother’s Milk of Politics’, in
Political Research Quarterly.
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